Australia’s September 11th
The Future of Australian-Islamic South Asian Relations
By Thomas J. Haidon
The recent attack in Bali has incurred a catastrophic human toll on its victims and has had the effect of further destabilizing an already politically and culturally untenable relationship between Australia and the Islamic world (primarily South East Asia).
In the aftermath of the attack, which took the lives of approximately one hundred Australian nationals, one cannot help recount images of the result of the attacks of September 11th. To Australia, the Bali attacks were its own equivalent of September 11th. At the critical stage following the attack, Australia is in a state of mourning. While it mourns however, Australia is calculating and measuring a response commensurate with its losses.
Since the attack, Australia and other western powers have placed significant pressure on the Indonesian government to weed out Islamic fundamentalists that support terrorism. However, questions remain as to the future of Australia's relationship with Islamic South Asia. Is Australia slowly following the path of the United States and becoming the "America" of the Southern Hemisphere? Could the military relationship between the United States and Australia potentially shift the primary focus of the "war on terror" to Islamic South Asia? A preliminary answer to these questions is yes. Alternatively, is the price of appeasing the antagonists of the "war on terror" more than Indonesia and Islamic South Asia can bear?
Australia's relationship with Indonesia has a troubled history. Indonesia strongly opposed Australia's part in the international peace keeping mission that took place in East Timor in 1999, which it viewed primarily as a matter of domestic concern. Since the resolution of that conflict, both Australia and Indonesia have attempted to mend their political relationship.
The two countries hit a deadlock in August 2001 when both refused to accept 433 boat people rescued from a sinking Indonesian ferry headed towards Australia. Furthermore, Indonesia's handling of Australia-bound Middle Eastern asylum-seekers that set sail from the archipelago remained a thorny issue between the two nations. Immigration and the handling (or mishandling) of refugees remains a major point of contention, and will likely be widened now with the recent attacks in Bali.
The attacks of September 11th created an ambience of distrust between Indonesia and Australia. On October 11, 2001 the Australian Department of the Parliamentary Services released a paper to legislators entitled: "Indonesia and Transnational Terrorism." The document served as a quasi-intelligence report that discussed Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. While the document said: "the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims practice a moderate form of the religion," the focus of the paper was the threat that Indonesian Islamic organizations pose.1
Levels of mistrust between the two countries, developed further as both nations began to work together to formulate a bilateral agreement on counter-terrorism, which was tentatively reached in March of 2002. The Bali attacks, to a great extent, may dishevel the fragile economic and diplomatic frameworks established since East Timor, which became strained further after September 11th.
The ANZUS Treaty: Will Australia be the "America" of the Southern Hemisphere?
Since September 11th, Australia has been posing a significant threat to the political stability of Islamic South Asia. In the aftermath of September 11th, Australia invoked the ANZUS treaty or the "Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America." This treaty was signed in 1951 by all three parties. However, recently, New Zealand unofficially withdrew itself from the treaty during the 1980's, following a disagreement with the United States in which New Zealand refused to allow the United States access for nuclear frigates (allowing access would have violated long established New Zealand policies). ANZUS creates obligations upon the United States and Australia to defend the other from attacks. In part, ANZUS states in Article V:
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.2
The term "armed attack" in Article V is not an exacting definition. Within the meaning of the treaty, Australia or the United States could make an argument that an attack on a party's nationals in a foreign country constitutes an "armed attack" for the purposes of ANZUS. Theoretically, the United States and Australia, could possibly justify retaliation against Islamic groups in Indonesia through this interpretation.
However, at present, there is a minimal danger of this occurring. Nonetheless, the danger is self-evident. If an attack takes place on Australian soil, and the source comes from an Islamic South Asian group, then perhaps a real danger exists of Australia and the United States retaliating pursuant to ANZUS. Conversely, if the United States is faced by an "armed attack" from an Islamic South Asian group, under the above interpretation, Australia could act as the long arm of the United States.
Australia will likely base and pledge its support for United States unilateralist action against Iraq based on ANZUS. To lend support to the previous interpretational argument, Iraq has not committed an "armed attack" against the United States, nor has it posed an "imminent" threat to the United States. Yet, Australia will likely assist the United States militarily, pursuant to ANZUS.
This shows a dangerous propensity. If Australia will act militarily to vindicate the interests of its ANZUS counterpart, than certainly it will not hesitate to enlist the "assistance" of the United States to commence its own "war on terror" in Islamic South Asia. If and when further attacks continue against Australia and/or Australian nationals, the ANZUS treaty may be the tool that both Australia and the United States implement. In a recent address President Bush noted:
I told the Prime Minister of Australia and I told Prime Minister Blair this morning that I'm absolutely determined to continue to lead the coalition. They recognize the need for us to continue to work together. And it's a sad day for a lot of people around the wor
ld… but it also is a day in which we've got to realize that we've got a long way to go to make the world more secure and more peaceful.
The failure of the United States to examine the root causes of September 11th holds deep implications that have not yet been fully realized. Australia is at a similar crossroads. Will Australia address the hard, painful questions that the United States summarily ignored after its tragedy? Surely a justification for the attacks in Bali cannot be proffered. But when examined in its context the issue becomes clearer. Why target Australians? A complex response is because Australia has chosen to not only align itself with the United States, but also to staunchly support military action directed at Muslim nations. According to a recent report: "But far from uniting the nation behind the war on terrorism, Howard has drawn immediate rebuke. Many Australian commentators are now saying that the Bali bomb attack was Australia's price for allying itself with America in the first place - that dead Australian teenagers are payback for the Afghan campaign and the moves to attack Iraq."3 Phil Adams, a journalist for The Australian, asserted:
I'd tried to remind Australia that rushing to America's colours was, as demonstrated in Vietnam, a health hazard. Before we signed up for the war against terror, wherever that might lead us, I thought it important to remember that the US has been the most trigger-happy of nations. With a long history of bellicosity and a culture of violence. It is now my sad duty to say...I told you so.4
Australia's invocation of ANZUS, and affirmation to support the American "war on terror" will only lead to future acts of terror against Australia and/or its nationals. Unqualified support for the "war on terror" will further marginalize the Islamic culture and society of South Asia, and create a climate that is ripe for terrorism.
Australia and the United States are on similar paths, and share similar interests in international security. One can only expect a more fortified relationship between the superpower of the northern hemisphere and the superpower of the southern hemisphere. Domestically speaking, in both nations, a cultural divide exists between Muslims and non-Muslims. The events of September 11th, simultaneously in both nations, created an even further divide. The attacks on Bali could place this relationship in a level of untenability.
In the immediate days following the Bali attacks, according to the report, an Islamic school was attacked and vandalized along with the family home of the local Imam. According to a recent BBC report:
There are some Australians who have never been comfortable with Muslims in Australia. Sydney Daily Telegraph, expressed feelings that a sizeable number of Australians seem to share: "It's about time we woke up to the fact that the problem of world terrorism today lies firmly rooted in Islam," the letter read. The uncomfortable fact is that racism lurks just below the surface in Australia. For some, the Bali attack is all the justification they need to give vent to their prejudice.5
Muslims in Australia face a credible threat and danger of a backlash from their fellow countrymen. The Australian Muslim predicament is analogous to the American Muslim predicament faced in the aftermath of September 11th. In the immediate days and weeks following September 11th, American Muslims, Islamic schools and Mosques became the popular target of hate crimes, perpetrated by non-Muslims. Islamic communities in both nations have found themselves in the harrowing position of themselves mourning the attacks and being blamed simultaneously for those attacks.
Indonesia's Response to the Bali Attacks
Indonesia's response to the attacks in Bali was swift. Within days, President Megawati made an executive decree that put anti-terror legislation in place. The decree is retroactive, meaning that it applies to the attacks in Bali. Pursuant to the decree, anyone who commits an "act of terror" will be executed by a firing squad. Furthermore the decree allows authorities to suspend habeas corpus for up to six months for those merely suspected of conducting "acts of terror."6 Many in the West had been quick to criticize Indonesia for "sitting on anti-terror legislation" following September 11th.
However, a response to that criticism is that Indonesia was wary of passing legislation that could incur possible infractions of civil rights and civil liberties. Achieving democracy in Indonesia after President Suharto has been a tumultuous process and an uneasy transition. Anti-terror legislation, prior to the attacks in Bali, could be seen by many Indonesians as a partial return to the autocracy of the Suharto regime that paralyzed peaceful and moderate Islamic practice. Despite this however, some Muslim organizations in Indonesia have pledged their qualified support to the Indonesian government. One of the largest of such groups, Muhhamdiyha, had this to say: "The Muhammadiyah can understand the need for such regulations, so that our security personnel, from the police or the intelligence, will have a legal umbrella to act against terrorism."7
From the outset, Indonesia has taken strong measures, contrary to Western criticism, to control the fringe element of Islamic militancy. These strong measures have come at a price, however. The first price will be paid by Indonesians whose lives could fundamentally be altered because of the anti-terror legislation, which could limit religious freedom of members of the world's largest Muslim nation. The second price will be paid by the Indonesian government, which will be seen by many Indonesians after the enacting of these measures as the "long arm" of Australia and the United States.
Is this price too much? Yes. The price will be too much for Indonesian Muslims to bear. If Indonesian Muslims are confronted once again with autocracy and foreign intervention, the political spectrum of Indonesian Muslims will change from left to moderate to right to far right where the seeds of terrorism lurk.
Australia and Indonesia (as well as Islamic South Asia) are at a dangerous crossroads. Australia is in a state of mourning, and has thus far taken a relatively measured approach toward Indonesia and Islamic South Asia. However if further attacks occur from the fringe element, Australia and the United States will likely shift the "war on terror" towards the region, thus creating a further cultural and political divide.
Indonesia is in the un-enviable position of facing imperialist threats from the United States and Australia as well as the possibility of a significant domestic backlash if it returns to the autocratic policies of Suharto. The effect of such pressure and legislation will only shift the moderate political dynamic that is so strong in Indonesia towards a far right ideology that is consistent with terrorism.
**************
The Future of Australian-Islamic South Asian Relations
By Thomas J. Haidon
The recent attack in Bali has incurred a catastrophic human toll on its victims and has had the effect of further destabilizing an already politically and culturally untenable relationship between Australia and the Islamic world (primarily South East Asia).
In the aftermath of the attack, which took the lives of approximately one hundred Australian nationals, one cannot help recount images of the result of the attacks of September 11th. To Australia, the Bali attacks were its own equivalent of September 11th. At the critical stage following the attack, Australia is in a state of mourning. While it mourns however, Australia is calculating and measuring a response commensurate with its losses.
Since the attack, Australia and other western powers have placed significant pressure on the Indonesian government to weed out Islamic fundamentalists that support terrorism. However, questions remain as to the future of Australia's relationship with Islamic South Asia. Is Australia slowly following the path of the United States and becoming the "America" of the Southern Hemisphere? Could the military relationship between the United States and Australia potentially shift the primary focus of the "war on terror" to Islamic South Asia? A preliminary answer to these questions is yes. Alternatively, is the price of appeasing the antagonists of the "war on terror" more than Indonesia and Islamic South Asia can bear?
Australia's relationship with Indonesia has a troubled history. Indonesia strongly opposed Australia's part in the international peace keeping mission that took place in East Timor in 1999, which it viewed primarily as a matter of domestic concern. Since the resolution of that conflict, both Australia and Indonesia have attempted to mend their political relationship.
The two countries hit a deadlock in August 2001 when both refused to accept 433 boat people rescued from a sinking Indonesian ferry headed towards Australia. Furthermore, Indonesia's handling of Australia-bound Middle Eastern asylum-seekers that set sail from the archipelago remained a thorny issue between the two nations. Immigration and the handling (or mishandling) of refugees remains a major point of contention, and will likely be widened now with the recent attacks in Bali.
The attacks of September 11th created an ambience of distrust between Indonesia and Australia. On October 11, 2001 the Australian Department of the Parliamentary Services released a paper to legislators entitled: "Indonesia and Transnational Terrorism." The document served as a quasi-intelligence report that discussed Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. While the document said: "the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims practice a moderate form of the religion," the focus of the paper was the threat that Indonesian Islamic organizations pose.1
Levels of mistrust between the two countries, developed further as both nations began to work together to formulate a bilateral agreement on counter-terrorism, which was tentatively reached in March of 2002. The Bali attacks, to a great extent, may dishevel the fragile economic and diplomatic frameworks established since East Timor, which became strained further after September 11th.
The ANZUS Treaty: Will Australia be the "America" of the Southern Hemisphere?
Since September 11th, Australia has been posing a significant threat to the political stability of Islamic South Asia. In the aftermath of September 11th, Australia invoked the ANZUS treaty or the "Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America." This treaty was signed in 1951 by all three parties. However, recently, New Zealand unofficially withdrew itself from the treaty during the 1980's, following a disagreement with the United States in which New Zealand refused to allow the United States access for nuclear frigates (allowing access would have violated long established New Zealand policies). ANZUS creates obligations upon the United States and Australia to defend the other from attacks. In part, ANZUS states in Article V:
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.2
The term "armed attack" in Article V is not an exacting definition. Within the meaning of the treaty, Australia or the United States could make an argument that an attack on a party's nationals in a foreign country constitutes an "armed attack" for the purposes of ANZUS. Theoretically, the United States and Australia, could possibly justify retaliation against Islamic groups in Indonesia through this interpretation.
However, at present, there is a minimal danger of this occurring. Nonetheless, the danger is self-evident. If an attack takes place on Australian soil, and the source comes from an Islamic South Asian group, then perhaps a real danger exists of Australia and the United States retaliating pursuant to ANZUS. Conversely, if the United States is faced by an "armed attack" from an Islamic South Asian group, under the above interpretation, Australia could act as the long arm of the United States.
Australia will likely base and pledge its support for United States unilateralist action against Iraq based on ANZUS. To lend support to the previous interpretational argument, Iraq has not committed an "armed attack" against the United States, nor has it posed an "imminent" threat to the United States. Yet, Australia will likely assist the United States militarily, pursuant to ANZUS.
This shows a dangerous propensity. If Australia will act militarily to vindicate the interests of its ANZUS counterpart, than certainly it will not hesitate to enlist the "assistance" of the United States to commence its own "war on terror" in Islamic South Asia. If and when further attacks continue against Australia and/or Australian nationals, the ANZUS treaty may be the tool that both Australia and the United States implement. In a recent address President Bush noted:
I told the Prime Minister of Australia and I told Prime Minister Blair this morning that I'm absolutely determined to continue to lead the coalition. They recognize the need for us to continue to work together. And it's a sad day for a lot of people around the wor
ld… but it also is a day in which we've got to realize that we've got a long way to go to make the world more secure and more peaceful.The failure of the United States to examine the root causes of September 11th holds deep implications that have not yet been fully realized. Australia is at a similar crossroads. Will Australia address the hard, painful questions that the United States summarily ignored after its tragedy? Surely a justification for the attacks in Bali cannot be proffered. But when examined in its context the issue becomes clearer. Why target Australians? A complex response is because Australia has chosen to not only align itself with the United States, but also to staunchly support military action directed at Muslim nations. According to a recent report: "But far from uniting the nation behind the war on terrorism, Howard has drawn immediate rebuke. Many Australian commentators are now saying that the Bali bomb attack was Australia's price for allying itself with America in the first place - that dead Australian teenagers are payback for the Afghan campaign and the moves to attack Iraq."3 Phil Adams, a journalist for The Australian, asserted:
I'd tried to remind Australia that rushing to America's colours was, as demonstrated in Vietnam, a health hazard. Before we signed up for the war against terror, wherever that might lead us, I thought it important to remember that the US has been the most trigger-happy of nations. With a long history of bellicosity and a culture of violence. It is now my sad duty to say...I told you so.4
Australia's invocation of ANZUS, and affirmation to support the American "war on terror" will only lead to future acts of terror against Australia and/or its nationals. Unqualified support for the "war on terror" will further marginalize the Islamic culture and society of South Asia, and create a climate that is ripe for terrorism.
Australia and the United States are on similar paths, and share similar interests in international security. One can only expect a more fortified relationship between the superpower of the northern hemisphere and the superpower of the southern hemisphere. Domestically speaking, in both nations, a cultural divide exists between Muslims and non-Muslims. The events of September 11th, simultaneously in both nations, created an even further divide. The attacks on Bali could place this relationship in a level of untenability.
In the immediate days following the Bali attacks, according to the report, an Islamic school was attacked and vandalized along with the family home of the local Imam. According to a recent BBC report:
There are some Australians who have never been comfortable with Muslims in Australia. Sydney Daily Telegraph, expressed feelings that a sizeable number of Australians seem to share: "It's about time we woke up to the fact that the problem of world terrorism today lies firmly rooted in Islam," the letter read. The uncomfortable fact is that racism lurks just below the surface in Australia. For some, the Bali attack is all the justification they need to give vent to their prejudice.5
Muslims in Australia face a credible threat and danger of a backlash from their fellow countrymen. The Australian Muslim predicament is analogous to the American Muslim predicament faced in the aftermath of September 11th. In the immediate days and weeks following September 11th, American Muslims, Islamic schools and Mosques became the popular target of hate crimes, perpetrated by non-Muslims. Islamic communities in both nations have found themselves in the harrowing position of themselves mourning the attacks and being blamed simultaneously for those attacks.
Indonesia's Response to the Bali Attacks
Indonesia's response to the attacks in Bali was swift. Within days, President Megawati made an executive decree that put anti-terror legislation in place. The decree is retroactive, meaning that it applies to the attacks in Bali. Pursuant to the decree, anyone who commits an "act of terror" will be executed by a firing squad. Furthermore the decree allows authorities to suspend habeas corpus for up to six months for those merely suspected of conducting "acts of terror."6 Many in the West had been quick to criticize Indonesia for "sitting on anti-terror legislation" following September 11th.
However, a response to that criticism is that Indonesia was wary of passing legislation that could incur possible infractions of civil rights and civil liberties. Achieving democracy in Indonesia after President Suharto has been a tumultuous process and an uneasy transition. Anti-terror legislation, prior to the attacks in Bali, could be seen by many Indonesians as a partial return to the autocracy of the Suharto regime that paralyzed peaceful and moderate Islamic practice. Despite this however, some Muslim organizations in Indonesia have pledged their qualified support to the Indonesian government. One of the largest of such groups, Muhhamdiyha, had this to say: "The Muhammadiyah can understand the need for such regulations, so that our security personnel, from the police or the intelligence, will have a legal umbrella to act against terrorism."7
From the outset, Indonesia has taken strong measures, contrary to Western criticism, to control the fringe element of Islamic militancy. These strong measures have come at a price, however. The first price will be paid by Indonesians whose lives could fundamentally be altered because of the anti-terror legislation, which could limit religious freedom of members of the world's largest Muslim nation. The second price will be paid by the Indonesian government, which will be seen by many Indonesians after the enacting of these measures as the "long arm" of Australia and the United States.
Is this price too much? Yes. The price will be too much for Indonesian Muslims to bear. If Indonesian Muslims are confronted once again with autocracy and foreign intervention, the political spectrum of Indonesian Muslims will change from left to moderate to right to far right where the seeds of terrorism lurk.
Australia and Indonesia (as well as Islamic South Asia) are at a dangerous crossroads. Australia is in a state of mourning, and has thus far taken a relatively measured approach toward Indonesia and Islamic South Asia. However if further attacks occur from the fringe element, Australia and the United States will likely shift the "war on terror" towards the region, thus creating a further cultural and political divide.
Indonesia is in the un-enviable position of facing imperialist threats from the United States and Australia as well as the possibility of a significant domestic backlash if it returns to the autocratic policies of Suharto. The effect of such pressure and legislation will only shift the moderate political dynamic that is so strong in Indonesia towards a far right ideology that is consistent with terrorism.
**************
Thomas J. Haidon is an American attorney and activist residing in Wellington, New Zealand. He received a Jurisdoctorate (J.D.) with a certificate of international law from the University at Buffalo School of Law and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Niagara University. He has studied at the American University in Cairo and Birzeit University, Palestine. He is currently pursuing an L.L.M. in international law. You can reach him at thaidon@justice.com
___________________________________________________________________
1- Wilson, Chris. “Indonesia and Transnational Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group (a pdf file)
2- “Security Treaty Between the United States, New Zealand and Australia“ (a pdf file)
3- Appleton, Josie. “Backlash over Bali“ October 17, 2002.
4- Adams, Phillip. “Empire’s Always Right,” The Weekend Australian.
5- Hughes, Dominic “Sydney’s Muslims Fear Revenge Attacks,” BBC Online.
6- McDowell, Patrick. “Indonesia Issues Anti-Terror Decree,” Associated Press.
7- “Indonesia’s Muslims Back Terror Law,” BBC Online.
Source: http://www.islamonline.net/english/views/2002/10/article12.shtml
1- Wilson, Chris. “Indonesia and Transnational Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group (a pdf file)
2- “Security Treaty Between the United States, New Zealand and Australia“ (a pdf file)
3- Appleton, Josie. “Backlash over Bali“ October 17, 2002.
4- Adams, Phillip. “Empire’s Always Right,” The Weekend Australian.
5- Hughes, Dominic “Sydney’s Muslims Fear Revenge Attacks,” BBC Online.
6- McDowell, Patrick. “Indonesia Issues Anti-Terror Decree,” Associated Press.
7- “Indonesia’s Muslims Back Terror Law,” BBC Online.
Source: http://www.islamonline.net/english/views/2002/10/article12.shtml
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